Abstract
Citizenship is one of the defining social and political categories of modernity. Its conceptualization is strongly tied to the emergence of nation-states and the structuring of international relations in terms of the sovereignty of nation-states. However, it is also predicated upon a deeper, racialized structuring of the social world, which rarely informs debates about its constitution. In this article, I look at the ways in which citizenship has been understood, examine its dominant intellectual genealogy, and address its deeper racialized structures. I use the perspective of ‘connected sociologies’ with which to undertake this task.

Keywords: citizenship, connected sociologies, race, settler colonialism, United States

Introduction
Citizenship is not only to be understood in terms of abstract categories of membership and rights, but also in terms of the historical narratives that frame its initial conceptualizations. These narratives are not unambiguous, however, and the historical inclusion of some groups within citizenship has often been associated with the active exclusion of other groups, even as seemingly universal claims are being made. Ideas of citizenship, for example, frequently trace an intellectual genealogy to the ancient city states of Greece and Rome and describe its modern realization in Europe and North America, most notably through the ‘the English Civil War, the American War of Independence, and the French Revolution’. The positive articulation of citizenship through these events, however, simplifies the historical narrative and rarely addresses the (racialized) exclusions that were also constitutive of them.

In this article, I focus on the histories associated with the emergence of modern citizenship in the United States, especially those histories that are rarely acknowledged, but are, I argue, nonetheless constitutive. In particular, I argue for the necessity of addressing the histories of indigeneity and settler colonialism as well as enslavement and forced labour as constituting the wider context for the emergence of ideas and practices of modern citizenship in the US. Ultimately, my interest is in situating the account of modern citizenship in the United States within a consideration of its wider colonial past and (post)colonial present. Taking the perspective of ‘connected sociologies’, I suggest that the failure to address the historical complexity that is the condition for the emergence of ideas of citizenship leads to a problematic contemporary politics; including, in this case, a problematic politics of citizenship.

Connected Sociologies: An Analytic Approach
The emergence of sociology in the nineteenth century, and the consequent organization of the social sciences, typically institutionalizes a version of ‘civilizational’ analysis organized around the idea of separate histories. Sociology, in this perspective, takes as its remit the study of ‘us’, understood as modern, as opposed to the study of a traditional ‘them’ that is the domain of anthropology. The
differentiation of us and them on the basis of separate histories gives rise to the justification for attempts at understanding these differences and looking to account for them within their endogenous dynamics. These dynamics are often devolved to civilizational characteristics such as ‘the Orient’ or ‘the West and the Rest’. The perspective of ‘connected sociologies’, in contrast, starts from a recognition that events and histories are constituted by processes that are always broader than the selections that bound them as particular and specific to their theoretical constructs. While knowledge can never be total, the selections we make have consequences for its ordering. That ordering is always open to challenge in light of different selections and re-orderings. Connected sociologies seek to break down the endogenous accounts offered within standard sociological approaches to reveal the interconnections that undermine claims for endogenous developments deriving from the special characteristics of particular ‘cultures’ or ‘peoples’.

While Edward W. Said’s Orientalism – a foundational text within academic discourse pointing to the mutually constituting relationship between colonial knowledge and colonial power – presents a novel structure through which to think about the ways in which the ‘other’ has traditionally been conceptualized, it does not adequately address the complexity of the historical context within which he locates his argument. Further, in the translation of Orientalism across disciplines, where it is often used as a short-hand, the very abstraction that Said critiques – that is, the abstraction of a pure East historically and conceptually independent of a similarly pure West – gets reinforced through the use of ‘types’, ideal or otherwise, common across the social sciences. Both of these tendencies reinforce the idea of a particular historical narrative, one which is based on the idea of an enduring separation between East and West. This separation is presented as historical and this is then used to justify the existence of separate ontologies and epistemologies – separate ontologies and epistemologies which are then required to be compared, reconciled and or incorporated; all the while forgetting that their separation was itself willed, or constructed, and not ‘naturally’ occurring.

This is perhaps most clearly manifest in the civilizational approach underpinning the turn to ‘multiple modernities’ by theorists such as Shmuel Eisenstadt and his followers. This body of work builds on Weber’s comparative sociology of world religions and cultures, and Jaspers’ earlier work on the emergence of Axial Age civilizations, to examine the trajectory of modernity into divergent forms. There is a fundamental concern with identifying the form of modernity associated with the West and then examining the cultural dynamics of other religions and/or civilizations in comparison to it. The fundamental assumption here is that civilizations exist as distinct entities and are constituted through different core values or practices that are historically foundational and that maintain, over time, an integrity of identity as a cultural pattern or tradition.

This can be seen to be the everyday underpinning assumption of the very disciplinary divide between sociology and anthropology, for example, and has, I suggest, two consequences. First, in its own terms, it obscures other places and the connections and relations between places and peoples. Second, it naturalizes, and reads back through history, a separation which is more a nineteenth century conceit than a historical claim adequately supported in relation to the standards of the different disciplines with which it has come to be associated. As Uma Narayan notes, Rudyard Kipling’s oft-quoted statement – ‘Oh, East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet’ – is articulated at a historical juncture when ‘East’ and ‘West’ are explicitly entangled in a series of protracted encounters: namely, colonialism, dispossession, and enslavement. The consolidation of
this conceit, of historically separate entities, and the institutional effacement of the connected histories of colonialism and enslavement, occurs, in large part, through the disciplinary organization of knowledge itself.

The approach of connected sociologies, in contrast, recognises a plurality of possible interpretations and selections, not as a ‘description’, but as an opportunity for reconsidering what we previously thought we had known. Mere external contingencies from one perspective become central features in another. To understand events through their connections is to acknowledge from the outset that addressing particular sets of connections leads to particular understandings which are put in question through choosing other sets of connections. This is not a choice guided by whim, but through an argument for why certain connections were initially chosen and why choosing others could lead to more adequate explanations.9

Conceptual issues such as the forms of modern subjectivity and citizenship are not simply theoretical abstractions; they emerge from consideration of the historical data that is used to support or contest particular claims. If the historical account being used is inadequate, and can be demonstrated to be otherwise than is presented, then it is incumbent upon us to re-examine our conceptual delineations in terms of these different historical narratives.

I have argued elsewhere that this is not an argument for relativism, but rather for the appropriate consideration of new evidence in enabling us to rethink the adequacy of concepts associated with narratives which have now been superseded. It is an argument for the reconstruction of concepts and the reinterpretation of histories in the light of that reconstruction. Put another way, engaging with different histories must move us beyond simple pluralism to make a difference to what we had initially thought. This is the push to reconstruction central to my conception of ‘connected sociologies’, whereby understandings are reconstructed as a consequence of the significant new connections identified. To put it most strongly, there is no connection where there is no reconstruction; and no understanding remains unchanged by connection.10

The instance I shall be examining in this article focuses on claims for citizenship where particular connections have been systematically denied by the dominant group, both historically and conceptually, in terms of their very definition of what constitutes citizenship. In particular, I will address the emergence and development of ideas of political citizenship in the United States. My concern is not primarily with the intellectual genealogy of political citizenship, but rather with how a connected sociologies approach towards US history forces us to reconsider its political potency and universal potential.

Citizenship: Conceptual Histories

Debates on modern conceptions of citizenship have tended to be framed in terms of modes of political inclusion within, and exclusion from, nation states.11 While the central question in these debates, as Engin Isin suggests, has often been ‘who is the citizen?’, it needs, he argues, to move to addressing ‘what makes the citizen?’.12 Citizenship, for him, is a practice of contestation through which subjects become political. Further, in theorizing citizenship, he states that it is necessary to understand it as ‘an institution in flux embedded in the current social and political struggles that
constitute it'. As such, citizenship is posited both as a performative act, by subjects who claim the right to have rights, and as an institution constituted through those performances. By making citizenship performative, however, and seeking to understand it in these terms, a number of underlying assumptions are brought into the analysis that, I would suggest, require further scrutiny.

The succinct analysis as presented here presumes the existence of two domains: a political domain and a non-political domain. It suggests that it is through struggles for citizenship that people move from non-political society to political society; that is, from being excluded to being included. This assumes that people outside of citizenship are not political and that being outside of citizenship is not itself politically constituted in terms of stabilising particular relations of domination. Further, there is no recognition within the analysis as posed that the very idea of citizenship being mobilized is itself constitutive of the division that is then to be overcome through struggles for citizenship. In effect, there is a privileging both of a particular definition of citizenship and of privilege itself. The definition of modern citizenship utilized here makes invisible the processes by way of which (political) privilege becomes entrenched and regularized as the norm against which other processes are then to be measured and accorded (or not) the status 'political'. It further creates the necessity for struggles that draw upon the very categories that ‘perform’ the initial exclusion. This ‘making invisible’, I suggest, occurs as a consequence of our abstraction of the conceptual category of modern citizenship from the circumstances in which it was initially articulated.

As I have argued, the idea of citizenship strongly associated with the European intellectual tradition is often traced back to the ancient worlds of Greece and Rome. Modern citizenship, in turn, is seen to emerge in the context of the development of the ‘subject capable of property’ (Hegel) and the idea of membership (with its attendant inclusions and exclusions) within a nation-state. It is further defined against two other understandings of the subject: the subject incapable of property (because of a deficit of reason whether through capacity or the burden of self-subsistence and/or enslavement), and the subject indifferent to property (as defined in individuated terms). Within the first definition, some subjects are denied citizenship because they are not free of the dictates of subsistence and reproduction (this includes men without property and women); some because they are regarded as lacking in the quality of being a reasoning subject (women and children); others, more significantly, are denied it as a consequence of the institution of chattel slavery which combines both these reasons and further treats those subjected to it as the objects / property of others. The second exclusion is that of the subject who does not recognize individuated property (i.e., the inhabitants of lands that Europeans wish to occupy and appropriate, that is, take into individual ownership).

The association of the ‘subject’ with ideas of the ‘modern’ has different consequences for the different groups initially excluded from being understood as modern subjects and from the attendant rights of modern citizenship. The struggles of un-propertied European men and of European women against their exclusion from modern citizenship in the United States sees that exclusion remedied through their eventual assimilation into the dominant category of modern subjecthood and the extension of citizenship rights to them. This is not to suggest, however, that those struggles necessarily fully accomplished equality. As Nancy Cott argues, ‘The uneven and unfinished path to [European] women’s full citizenship illustrates the familiar lesson that formal inclusion in the political arena is never as decisive and determinative as formal exclusion.’
The exclusions of European women and unpropertied European men had been based upon the understanding that they did not possess the attributes of rationality or the capacity to rise above mere subsistence and so could not be seen to be modern subjects. Once their struggles against such definitions began to be successful, it was further recognized that they had always been part of the history of modern societies, and so ought to have been included in the initial definition of modern subjecthood. Hence, modern citizenship was extended to these subjects and there was recognition that the historical delineation of the associated conceptual categories had been erroneous and that this needed to be rectified. In large part, it was rectified through the assimilation of these excluded subjects into the dominant understanding of the categories and an alignment of their historical pasts with the mainstream historical narrative; their inclusion, it is suggested, was implied by the categories when those categories are properly understood. The struggles, and the refusal to struggle, of the others who were also excluded are much more difficult to resolve. Simple assimilation in their case can never be an option because assimilation into the conceptual category also requires alignment with the dominant historical narrative; a narrative which would require them to efface the histories of enslavement, dispossession, and annihilation in favour of a celebratory narrative centred on, for example, the idea of ‘we the people, toward a more perfect union’ (on which more later).

The modern (European) subject is defined in terms of self-ownership in the context of wider discourses of emancipation and equality and located in the context of the practices of taking others into ownership and appropriating their means of subsistence and reproduction. Modern citizenship is itself enacted through these processes of exclusion. Those subjects who were alienated from the idea of self-ownership, by themselves being taken into ownership – or, more simply, enslaved – cannot just be included within understandings of modern subjecthood that are based on the idea of the subject capable of property. Those subjects who refuse self-alienation through their disavowal of the very idea of individuated property – and who were dispossessed and annihilated in the process of the European expression of modern subjecthood – similarly are unable simply to be accommodated into a definition of modern subjecthood.

Both groups not only stand outside of standard understandings of the modern subject epistemologically, but their outsider position is itself a consequence of historical actions undertaken by European subjects as the expression of their own modern subjectivity. Given the centrality of ideas of the modern subject to citizenship, this further means that citizenship cannot simply be extended to these other groups as it is based from the outset on their epistemological and historical exclusion. Both of these groups come together in the US and the original ‘we the people’ excludes both from the ‘we’ that is regarded as determining modern citizenship. These exclusions, then, are constitutive of the form of modern citizenship and their inclusion would require an address of the initial exclusionary moment both conceptually and materially.

Given that our dominant understandings of citizenship see it as a mechanism for producing inclusion; we fail to understand its beginnings as an institution fundamentally based on exclusion. This exclusion cannot be regarded as a mere contingency. As a consequence, those who are excluded are doubly disavowed. Their exclusion is not properly acknowledged at the point of the emergence of the idea of citizenship; and the continuation of that exclusion in the context of the resources that
citizenship provides is often seen as an aspect of their own flawed subjectivity, or their lack of modernity. They are made responsible for their exclusion and those who seek to be included are validated as political while those who do not are regarded as flawed (and / or non-modern) subjects. What is missed in such analyses is the pre-existing political frame that organizes actors into being political or non-political, included or excluded. This political frame is rarely interrogated or indeed made responsible for the subsequent labelling that affords resources to some at the expense of others. By making citizenship performative, what is missed is the fact that there has already been a division performed that creates the positive form of citizenship as one of making demands in the political sphere at the same time as that political sphere is always restricted and works to maintain the institutions of privilege. In this way, all claims become concessions and privilege remains privileged. This is also the case for those others who were initially excluded but then assimilated, European men without property and European women. While their assimilation and alignment, to some extent, ameliorates their material conditions and concedes them citizenship rights it nonetheless maintains the historically dominant structures of privilege and inequality through which ‘common citizenship’ operates.

Dispossession, Enslavement, and Settler Colonialism in the United States
The constitution of the United States sets out the idea that government ought to be by the people and for the people and raises, of course, the question of ‘who are the people?’ In its articulation of what have come to be seen as modern democratic ideals, that is, the principles of equality and personal liberty, the US Constitution was seen to lead the way for other nations. It is often regarded as one of the founding documents of modern citizenship and resonates with contemporary interpretations, such as Isin’s, which define citizenship as a practice of contestation through which subjects become political. The simple, seductive, phrase, ‘we the people’, however, effaces a complex history that very few scholars have adequately addressed in their intellectual genealogies of modern citizenship. In this section, I briefly address the standard historical narratives of the emergence and development of political citizenship in the US and examine the exclusions within such narratives. I then discuss how we may develop our understandings of citizenship if we take seriously the exclusions that constitute earlier forms.

The celebratory and exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the founding of the United States is often traced to Tocqueville’s classic 1835 study, Democracy in America. In this, Tocqueville provides a comparative sociology of the institutions of democracy and citizenship in the United States and his depiction of the vibrancy of institutions and political culture there is pointedly contrasted with the traditional hierarchy and outmoded forms found within France (notwithstanding its recent revolutionary history). The fact that the US is a ‘new nation’, Tocqueville suggests, means that it is able to forge its own destiny free of the encumbrances of history and tradition that continue to inflect European political forms. As such, it is seen to embody a particular form of modernity; one that is purified from the residues of Europe’s feudal past. It is seen not only to demonstrate the promise for emancipation regarded as inherent to modernity, but also to be the first lived expression of this modern form of politics and citizenship. It is the latter analytical point, in particular, that has contributed to Tocqueville’s study becoming central to the self-understanding of the US as a democratic nation and to subsequent scholarly engagements with his work around the idea of political citizenship.
While many scholars and commentators on modern citizenship have oriented their analytical focus around Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* and the idea of the exceptionalism of US modernity, very few have gone on to address Tocqueville’s other significant claim made within this work. Namely that the land of the United States is occupied by *three* races and that his account of democracy is primarily about only one of them because the history of the other two is of their subjugation by the very institutions and practices that are otherwise being praised. Tocqueville’s account of democracy and citizenship in America cannot be adequately appraised or utilized without also taking into account his analysis of the *deficiencies* of both as seen from the perspective of the two races usually excluded from such discussion: ‘the Indians and the Negroes’. Both groups, he writes, ‘suffer the effects of tyranny, and, though their afflictions are different, they have the same people to blame for them’. Tocqueville’s celebration of US democracy, in particular the ‘equality of conditions’ that gave rise to its modern form of citizenship, is tempered by his observation of the treatment of ‘Indians and Negroes’ at the hands of these ‘democratic Europeans’. However, the complexity of social relations to which Tocqueville points is rarely addressed by subsequent scholars in their own examinations of democracy and citizenship. What is usually silenced is the *domination* upon which modern forms of citizenship are founded.

The transformation of the continent into the United States of America – the modern democratic republic lauded by political scientists and others for the emergence of the modern form of citizenship – occurred through historical processes of dispossession, displacement, enslavement and domination; historical processes that have rarely entered into mainstream considerations of the emergence and development of political citizenship there. The standard narrative moves from depictions of a white settler society establishing modes of democratic participation through the struggle for independence and freedom to that of an immigrant society in which all are able to strive to achieve ‘the American dream’. The two groups, however, which cannot partake of the founding rhetoric of independence as constituting the moment of freedom, or the subsequent narrative of achieving the American dream through an identity based on immigration, are Black Americans (Africans brought over in a condition of slavery and servitude which continued long after national independence and those early delimited struggles for freedom and democracy) and Native Americans (the displaced and dispossessed earlier inhabitants of the continent). Both of these groups are ‘out of place’ in the standard narratives and their displacement, material and epistemological, is what is at issue here.

The historical narrative of political citizenship within the United States is one of gradual inclusion and the creation of ‘a more perfect union’. This, indeed, was the focus of one of Barack Obama’s speeches while on the campaign trail for the US Presidency in 2008. In it, he recognized that the constitution ‘was stained by this nation’s original sin of slavery’, but argued forcefully that ‘the answer to the slavery question was already embedded within our Constitution – a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law; a Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a union that could be and should be perfected over time.’ The implication of this is that the union, including its exclusions, was perfect, but that it could be made ‘more perfect’ – that is, include those who had been excluded – by using the very resource – that is, the constitution of the union – which itself regarded enslavement as not incompatible with its perfection. Indeed, the contradiction inherent to this idea is evident in the rhetoric of the
contemporary Tea Party movement in the United States which calls for a return to the original ‘perfect’ constitution and seeks to ‘take back America’ – with the barely disguised racist implication being ‘take back America from a Black President.’

Given the central role played by the constitution in the identity of the United States, and of its citizens, the call for gradual inclusivity leaves the space for citizenship to be determined by the original exclusionary definition. Buying into the narrative of ‘a more perfect union’ enables the original document to be regarded as abstractly perfect and by implication justifies and legitimates the material conditions within which it was created. Refusing to interrogate what equality and citizenship meant at the time in terms of the lived expression of these conceptual categories perpetuates those very inequalities. Our understanding of ‘equal citizenship’ as outlined in the US constitution needs to be understood in the full context of US history and held to account, as Tocqueville suggests, for the differences between the abstract espousal of equality and the continuing material realities of the same as they pertain to different constituencies.

Alongside the enslavement of a people, there was another historical process central to the founding of the United States which could equally be considered as constituting ‘this nation’s original sin’: that is, the displacement and dispossession of the earlier inhabitants of the continent. Yet this narrative is similarly silenced within dominant accounts such as those outlined above. To the extent that Native Americans are discussed in the context of the history of the United States, they are often done so within a historiographical frame organized around the idea of the stadial development of societies. Such a frame places Native Americans in the pre-history of the United States and regards their gradual disappearance as natural and inevitable, associated, as it is, with the progress of modernity itself. This is borne out in depictions of Native Americans as ‘the vanishing race’ or in terms of being ‘the noble savage’. Both epithets displace Native Americans from consideration in the history of the United States and justify their dispossession as part of the long march of progress. This is so both in terms of the ‘universal progress’ of humanity and more specifically in terms of the ‘manifest destiny’ of the United States itself.

In general terms, as information about Native Americans reached Europe, they were regarded to be a people that represented the pre-historical past of humanity – as Locke argued, ‘in the beginning all the world was America’ – and so in encountering them, Europeans believed themselves to be encountering their ancestors. It is in the present condition of the natives of North America, Ferguson wrote, for example, ‘that we are to behold, as in a mirrour [sic], the features of our own progenitors.’ In this way, despite existing at the same time as those who wrote about them, they were placed, historiographically, in an earlier time. And, just as the Ancients had given way to the Moderns, it was believed that Native Americans would give way to Europeans. Their ‘vanishing’ was seen as preordained, as natural, as inevitable and not as the outcome of policies and practices of displacement, dispossession and annihilation. Travelling across space, then, had been reinterpreted as travelling back in time where, as Fox argues, ‘the Others they encountered were earlier versions of themselves.’

This general framing was reproduced in local narratives and histories where Native Americans were cast as pre-historical remnants of the continental landscape, but not as full citizens of modern society. They were simply the non-consequential earlier inhabitants, the ‘first Americans’, who were
to be displaced by those who subsequently arrived on the shores of this continent. These later arrivals, who would create themselves as Americans in the process of creating the United States of America, mourned the passing of the earlier inhabitants (to the extent that they did) as they mourned the passing of the wild herds of buffalo that had roamed the plains. As Dixon, for example, notes in his elegy to Native Americans, titled *The Vanishing Race*, ‘The buffalo has gone from the continent, and now the Indian is following the deserted buffalo trail.’\(^{34}\) While Native Americans may have been recognized as historically significant in terms of the prehistory of the US, they were both epistemologically and materially displaced as no longer part of its telos.

The presentation of the native inhabitants as embodying an earlier time, while existing at the same time, enabled a justification of territorial dispossession based on an assumption of linear development that saw that way of life being ‘naturally’ superseded in time. However, increasing evidence contests the presentation of native communities as ‘primitive’ and as easily displaced and dispossessed and instead argues for the history of the United States to be seen more appropriately in terms of contestation and challenge where the eventual victor was not always guaranteed to win. Hamaleinen’s epic history of the Comanche empire, for example, ‘tells the familiar tale of expansion, resistance, conquest, and loss, but with a reversal of usual historical roles.’\(^{35}\) The volume charts the expansion, power and increasing prosperity of a small tribe of hunter-gatherers who, in becoming the ‘Lords of the South Plains’, were able to forestall Euro-American expansion across the continent until the late nineteenth century. Joan Cocks, in a different vein, points to the foundational violence involved in establishing the modern republic and to the erasure of that violence from most historical accounts. She highlights, in particular, ‘the approximately 367 treaties signed by American Indians and ratified by the United States government’ by way of which ‘Indian Territory was turned into U.S. territory and Indian Country was transformed into settler property.’\(^{36}\) As Jeanette Wolfley similarly argues, ‘federal efforts to assimilate Indians, obtain Indian lands, and terminate tribal governments’ were not natural or preordained, they were a direct consequence of deliberate policies and practices.\(^{37}\)

The issue is not only that Native Americans were, or were not, as depicted in European and later American representations, but what is also at issue are the consequences of particular representations on the political possibilities available to different groups. The misrecognition of Native Americans as inhabiting an earlier time, while existing at the same time, was further compounded by the failure of commentators even to ‘see’ Native Americans. In his discussion of journals kept by Lewis and Clark in their early nineteenth century expedition across the continental landmass, for example, Greenfield describes how these journals narrate many accounts of native peoples, their relation to the land, and their own everyday interactions and dealings with dozens of Indian groups along the way.\(^{38}\) At the same time, however, the dominant narrative produced by Lewis and Clark was one of an empty and ‘virginal’ land waiting to be discovered and appropriated. As Greenfield writes, ‘it required a special rhetoric to respond to the land as essentially empty and waiting to be discovered, while daily documenting their exchanges with its inhabitants.’\(^{39}\) This form of disjointed recognition, I suggest, is present in much of the history of the US which manages to disassociate the rhetoric of its founding from the social and political realities of the time and so facilitates an understanding of modern citizenship based on exclusions without even recognizing those exclusions as central to its conceptualization.
Conclusion

The circumstances in which modern citizenship emerged within the United States was in response to inequality, as a justification of that inequality, and not its resolution; that is, the inequalities represented by modern citizenship are better theorised, as Danielle Allen argues, in terms of ‘domination’ rather than in terms of ‘exclusion’.\(^\text{40}\) Using the language of inclusion and exclusion suggests that those who were excluded were outside of the domains of political negotiation when modes of citizenship were being deliberated and enacted. Their exclusion is naturalised and effaced till the point that demands for inclusion open up the necessity of acknowledging their presence. By presenting their existence only at the point of demanding inclusion the prior exclusion is negated and presented as non-existent, rather than understanding it, more properly, as an instance of domination when these others were ‘made invisible’. In making her argument, Allen draws on the ways in which Hannah Arendt and Ralph Ellison address issues of injustice, both theoretically and in terms of their different responses to the civil rights struggles going on in the United States in the 1950s.

For Arendt, Allen suggests, inequality is to be addressed by ‘remedying exclusion’, whereas for Ellison, it would be by ‘undoing domination’.\(^\text{41}\) The different points of focus put the ‘invisible’ people, for Arendt, ‘outside’ of politics, or the common world that produced their invisibility; whereas for Ellison, the invisible people are dominated within the political realm that is itself constituted by those modes of domination.\(^\text{42}\) The implications of this divergence is that for Arendt, as Allen highlights, the political realm, based on the exclusion / domination of some citizens, is seen as healthy and requiring only the inclusion of those others into it (and what is necessary for this is, in Arendt’s terms, their education to the norms of citizenship as already established). In contrast, for Ellison, the undoing of domination, as Allen demonstrates, requires both the included and excluded, the visible and the invisible, to learn what it would take to create a healthy political realm in the future.\(^\text{43}\)

The exclusions and modes of subjugation that provided the context for the emergence of particular ideas of equal citizenship need to be recognized as integral to those forms today. It is only by recognizing enslavement and dispossession as constitutive aspects of the polity that is the United States of America that the legacies of such practices can be adequately addressed in the present. To the extent that such practices and the peoples to whom they relate are excluded from canonical statements pertaining to the history of the United States the injustices emanating from them will continue to exist; injustices evidenced by the continuing and severe racial gaps in almost every dimension of social, economic and political life within the United States.\(^\text{44}\) The injustices of displacement, dispossession, enslavement and domination are not, and have not been, overcome by simply extending ‘equal citizenship’ to those who were previously excluded from it and subjugated by it. Citizenship itself needs to be rethought in the context of its wider history, its connected histories and sociologies, and new conceptual forms developed from those reconstructed accounts.

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5. See, for example, the critique made by Aijaz Ahmad, that Said reifies Europe, in part at least, by failing to differentiate the temporality of the Orientalist project – thanks to the editors of this special issue for this point. Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994). For further elaboration of Said’s analysis as it pertains to the way in which I use it within the project of rethinking global historical sociology, see Gurminder K Bhamra, ‘Postcolonial and Decolonial Reconstructions’ in Connected Sociologies. (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
15. The complexities of modern citizenship (legal and civil) in the US and elsewhere are more extensive than can be covered in this short article which is focused, rather, on the general historical narratives underpinning its conceptual delineation in the context of the US. For an excellent overview of the ways in which race and immigration intersected with the extension (or not) of modes of formal and social citizenship in the US in the early twentieth century, see Randolph B. Persaud, “Situating Race in International Relations: The Dialectics of Civilizational Security in American Immigration” in Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair (eds.), Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004); Cybelle Fox, Three Worlds of Relief: Race, Immigration, and the American Welfare State from the Progressive Era to the New Deal. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). See also, Rogers M. Smith, “The ‘American Creed’ and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun, 1988): pp. 225-251. For an account of such issues in the UK

16 See Turner 1993; Sassen 2006; Isin 2009.


19 As one of the editors of this special issue notes, in the case of the US the problem, or rather the contradiction, is solved (at least, to the satisfaction to the dominant group) through the construction ‘separate but equal’. For more on this, see Desmond S. King, Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the U.S. Federal Government. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).


21 This is not to suggest that no one has raised these issues before - See, Thurgood Marshall, “Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Nov., 1987): 1-5 – rather simply to point to the paucity of analysis of the concept of citizenship through an acknowledgement of the deficiencies inherent in the idea of ‘we the people’ in its own time. See also, Joan Cocks, ‘Fundamental Violence and the Politics of Erasure’ in On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).

22 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America edited by J. P. Mayer, translated by George Lawrence. (New York: Perennial Classics, 2000 [1835]).


43 This, it should be noted, is also the lesson to be drawn from a proper reading of Tocqueville together with Beaumont, where, for Tocqueville, a key issue is the further education of African Americans to facilitate their participation in the democratic process and, for Beaumont, the corresponding issue is the education of white Americans such that they move beyond irrational race prejudice. For discussion, see, Gurminder K Bhambra and Victoria Margree, “Tocqueville, Beaumont and the Silences in Histories of the United States: An Interdisciplinary Endeavour across Literature and Sociology,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* Vol. 24 No. 1 (2010): 116–131